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BOOK REVIEWS
THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL.

York: Atherton Press.

1963.

By Charles S. Hyneman. New

Pp. ix, 308. $6.50.

One of the unintended consequences of the framing of the United
States Constitution has been an apparently unending succession of scholarly efforts to describe the true nature and functioning of the complex
political system that has its basis in that document. In retrospect, it seems
inevitable that each generation should find occasion to reexamine the
respective powers of each of the great institutions-President, Congress
and Court-, to dispute again and again the allocation of powers between
the nation and the states, especially since 1868 when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, and to define the boundaries of individual and
group rights against governmental power.
This process of reinterpretation of the Constitution and redefinition
of the functions and powers of each of our political institutions is inevitable because the values, needs, aspirations and ways of organizing the
work of any society change over time. With modern industrialized societies the swift pace of social change becomes a central and inescapable
fact conditioning all political thought and behavior and compelling a
constant reshaping of both formal and informal political behavior.
What makes the American political system so difficult to understand is that it represents a magnificent effort to achieve a perhaps impossible goal-to combine successfully in one document and one system
elements of unity and of decentralization, of separated powers and shared
powers, of grants of power to government and safeguards of individual
and group freedoms.
Such a system has invited continuing dispute and debate. There
has been no period during which all reasonable men have agreed about
the respective spheres of power of a President, the Congress or the Supreme Court. The Presidency, originally conceived essentially as a check
on the more powerful legislature, has, in the Twentieth Century, become
the pre-eminent American institution, while the prestige and creative
powers of Congress have waned, though the legislative power to resist the
President remains great. Yet writing as late as 1885, Woodrow Wilson
could describe and decry the tendency of Congress to dominate the Presidency.' But shifts of power between President and Congress are evident
1.

WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERN~MNT (2d ed. 1885).
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not only over long periods, but also from administration to administration, depending on the party in power, the President's conception of his
office and powers, and the quality of leadership available at a particular
time in Congress. An obvious explanation of enhanced executive power
lies in the sudden emergence of the United States as a world power, resulting in a heightened concern with foreign policy, and a succession of
wars which place a premium on Presidential initiative. In addition, differences between the constituencies of these two elective institutions go
far to explain their inability to view issues in the same light. Especially
in the modern era, the President's greater concern for the well-being of
his city-dwelling constituents, including Negroes and other minority
groups, compels him to seek social welfare measures that Congressmen
and their rural and small town constituents tend to resist. Whether or
not a redistricting of congressional seats, resulting from Wesberry v.
Sanders,2 changes the nature of congressional representation, the tides of
power flow inexorably toward the further strengthening of the Presidency.
If time has dealt favorably with the Presidency and more harshly
with the fortunes of Congress, what has been the fate of the Supreme
Court in its continuing search for a role?
Originally thought to be inevitably the weakest of the three national
organs,' the Court has over time managed to secure an important and in
some areas an almost decisive voice in the determination of national
policies. A body of appointed officials with life tenure, the court has
been under attack in virtually every decade. These attacks range widely
in character. A fundamental assault is grounded on the charge that the
Court was not given authority by the Constitution to determine in any
authoritative way the constitutionality of acts of Congress or actions of
the President, a position seemingly adopted by Professor Hyneman
against what he agrees to be the weight of authority. He is sympathetic
with the strong criticism expressed from time to time that the Justices
have allegedly read their own philosophy into the vague phrases of the
Constitution, a more tenable ground because many of the most important
provisions of the Constitution are hardly self-explanatory. Professor
Hyneman, as have others, decries the tendency of the Court to choose a
position and then rationalize what it has done by reference to one line of
precedents, or smatterings of history, or whatever comes to hand. The
Court has also been criticized from the beginning for favoring national
power at the expense of state power. Although it is impossible to challenge the legitimacy of this function of the Court in the light of the su2. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. TEiE FEDERALIST No. 78.
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premacy clause4 and the clear mandate in the Judiciary Act of 1789,'
authorizing review of state court decisions involving the Constitution,
laws or treaties of the United States, Professor Hyneman, in company
with numerous other critics, finds the Court too eager to settle issues that
are better left to the political processes. And as a clincher to the argument
that the Court is a policy-making, and not a judicial body, Professor
Hyneman as have critics of the judiciary before him, points to the Court's
refusal to adhere to precedents from time to time.
The Supreme Court on Trial is a study of the Supreme Court's role
in our political system, prompted by the severe criticism of the Court engendered by the school segregation decisions, a less focused attack by
congressmen who disliked decisions that allegedly weakened the battle
against native communist leaders, and resolutions of the Conference of
State Chief Justices, who at their 1958 meeting expressed their dismay
with Court decisions unfavorable to state power. This adds up to a
"trial" of the Court for Professor Hyneman, who seeks to understand
how the Court works without, as his preface puts it, telling the reader
"what my preferences, my predilections, my social bent may be."'
Essentially his study is not based on new source material, but represents a careful reading of the standard monographs and much of the
polemical literature of which there has been an abundance since 1954.
Whatever his intentions, the "preferences, predilections and social bent of
the author" emerge very clearly. In essence, Professor Hyneman does not
like the notion that the Supreme Court has a legitimate role in the shaping
of national policies. He finds appealing the minority scholarly view that
Marshall's assertion of judicial review in 1803 was an act of usurpation.
Hyneman seems to accept the fact that the Court was given the task of
serving as an umpire of the federal system, but quarrels with the way the
function has been carried out. Only elected, representative officials may,
in his view, rightfully share in the making of policy. The Court's proper
function, he would assert, is to decide cases that have no policy significance, leaving all other disputable issues to the political branches. Thus,
it was apparently proper for the Supreme Court to have held in Plessy v.
Ferguson' that separate but equal treatment of Negroes satisfied the requirements of the equal protection of the laws clause, because such a decision merely sanctioned political decisions in those states that required
segregation. The 1954 school segregation decision is criticized not only
as a breach with the law as declared in 1896 but, more importantly, be4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

U.S. CosT. art. IV, para. 2.
Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
P. viii.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cause it requires changes that Hyneman believes should be produced, if
at all, by actions of the elected branches of government.
What the author seeks, then, is a fundamental reinterpretation of the
American Constitution, and the political system that has emerged after
175 years. He seeks to put judicial power back in the bottle from which
it escaped in the early years of the Republic, and replace a tripartite political system with one in which major power is vested in President and
Congress. These are our representative institutions and Hyneman shows
little patience with the notion advanced by some scholars that the Supreme
Court has a representative function, varying from time to time in its
essential features, but hardly outside the mainstream of American political thought and action. The modern Court in particular has represented a variety of groups whose aspirations and claims could hardly
find expression through the normal political process. Indigent criminal
defendants, dissident political figures of communist and non-communist
hue, Jehovah's Witnesses, foes of school enforced religious exercises and
American Negroes have been among the constituents of the Supreme
Court in the modern era. To the Court, these and other parties have
turned in the hope of finding that the promises of the American Constitution were more than empty rhetoric. They have sought and found in
the Supreme Court a protector of claims which the "political" organs
failed to protect.
We have no way of knowing how our political systems would have
developed if the Supreme Court had from the beginning accepted the basic proposition that its only function was to accept every act of the President, the Congress (and presumably, most state actions) as valid, and to
have treated the Constitution simply as a body of admonitions to the
elective branches. It is of course possible, that the political organs would
have developed internal restraints that would have fulfilled the same
function as judicial review. But this is idle speculation. An independent
judiciary possessing and using the power to advance solutions to constitutional issues has been a part of the national and state political systems and
has helped shape the rules of political life for too long a time to be
lightly thrust aside.
The Court is, of course, always a fair target for critics who dispute
the correctness or propriety of its rulings. It is quite proper to point out,
as Professor Hyneman does, that the Supreme Court is more than a court
of law, that its decisions are of "political" significance, and that the
Court is a participant in the political process. But it is making political
decisions whatever the outcome. To accept or reject any claim is a political act in a political system that is not based on a simple majoritarian
principle. For example, Professor Hyneman discusses the Plessy deci-
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sion as the law, once handed down. But was it not a "political" decision
of the greatest significance to hold that a racial classification was permissible in spite of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws? 'Was it not political to hold that the dominant
forces of the community might treat a large minority as second-rate citizens ? In refusing to look behind the pretensions of "separate but equal,"
to see the separate but unequal public schools available to Negroes, in
overlooking discriminatory practices in the administration of laws pertaining to jury duty, voting and numerous other activities, the Supreme
Court was registering its approval of legally enforced inequality of rights.
Was this not a political decision?
There are many persons, including this reviewer, who would have
preferred a simpler, more direct formulation in the 1954 decision reversing Plessy. But when the Court held that its former "political" decision
had been wrong, it is not to be condemned because it refused to adhere to
a position that was unsound when first taken and less valid with each
passing year. To be sure, the Court could have blunted some criticism by
adopting a more devious tactic of finding that segregated schools were
9 suggested the direction
not truly equal. The decision in Sweat v. Painter
the Court might have taken. If intangible as well as physical factors
were taken into account, it would be relatively easy to conclude that any
"white" institution or facility was more favorably regarded by the majority of citizens. But to its credit, the Court rejected the path of subterfuge and forthrightly denounced "separate but equal" for the sham it had
always been, a classification imposed on a minority by the dominant political forces in the community. The alternative course of action, and
one, it would seem, preferred by Professor Hyneman, would be to remand
the Negro minority to the political branches, to Congress and the President. But if "separate but equal" was a constitutionally permissible doctrine, what chance was there that the political organs, which by definition
represent the majority in the community, would act to protect minority
rights? What, in short, is the purpose of a Bill of Rights, of guarantees
to minorities, if there is no chance that these guarantees can be given
meaning? This is the important burden that the modern Supreme Court
has assumed-to give reality to the high promises set forth in the Constitution-to say to the majority and their representatives that the Constitution envisages a free society, and that the Court is prepared to safeguard the rights of its humblest constituents. Whether the American
9. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The University of Texas Law School was regarded as
superior to a newly organized Negro school of law with respect to many factors
incapable of objective measurement, e.g., reputation of faculty, prestige of alumni, stand-

ing in the community.
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people will continue to sanction this assertion of power and responsibility
by the Court remains to be seen. It is a scant thirty years since the Supreme Court came under heavy attack in the 1930's, an attack which resulted in a changed judicial outlook, a new willingness to accept regulatory power of the federal government. And perhaps it is unrealistic to
assume that the Court can long protect minority rights if the dominant
majority through fear or impatience demands that they shall have their
way. But at least the Court compels the community to have a sober,
second thought. And ideals and values announced by the Court may
eventually find sufficient acceptance to counterbalance the tendency of
the politically powerful to ignore the just claims of the weak.
WILLIAM M. BEANEYt

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN AMERICA.

don. Washington: Public Affairs Press.

1963.

By Edward G. HuPp. xiv, 224. $4.50.

In his highly readable' volume containing just 179 pages of text,
Mr. Hudon does an excellent job of tracing the theories which through
history have underlain the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States interpreting the free speech and press provisions of the First
Amenidment to the Federal Constitution. The book neither attempts to
discuss the cases in detail nor to praise or condemn, except quite incidentally. Its primary purpose is to discover whether any of the tests of constitutional validity that successively have prevailed in the Court has been
more successful than the others, and whether the Court has now arrived
at a stable basis of decision.
The answer to both of the foregoing questions is in the negative,
but the author concludes with a suggested constitutional test based on the
specific beliefs of the fathers of the country, which he thinks may provide a sound basis for decision. His suggestion is closely allied to the
views so eloquently set forth by Mr. Justice Black in several noteworthy
opinions during the past five years and in his 1960 James Madison lecture at the New York University Law Center.2 The bibliography which
t Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
1. There are a number of typographical errors in the book, which better proofreading would have caught, and on page 83 the coined word "glimly" appears, perhaps
substituted for "dimly." On p. 126 the statute involved in Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952), is misstated as one designed simply "to punish libel of an individual"; but in general the author's capsule summaries of cases are remarkably
clear and correct.
2. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 865 (1960).

